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1ABSTRACT
This article addresses whether the WTO should extend permanent observer status to multilateral 
environmental agreements and analyzes the impact of injecting environmental issues into the multilateral trading 
system.  The paper begins with a chronological analysis of the transition from the GATT governance of international 
trade to the formation of the WTO and will also examine influences upon the formation and the agenda of the 
Committee on Trade and the Environment.  The discussion continues with a look at the Committee on Trade and the 
Environment’s first year of progress and discussion of the critical report entitled Special Studies 4: Trade and the 
Environment.  Following an evaluation of the impact of the first four WTO Ministerial Conferences is a discussion 
of the mechanics of the GATT’s anti-discrimination provisions and environmental exceptions.  Next, the discussion 
is supplemented by an analysis of international case law interpreting the environmental exceptions contained in 
GATT. The paper then proceeds to investigate the structure and function of the different types of trade provisions in 
several multilateral environmental agreements and their impact on the multilateral trading system. Furthermore, the 
article conducts a chronological analysis of the struggle endured by multilateral environmental agreements to 
acquire observer status in the WTO and the relevant implications of their participation in WTO proceedings.  
Finally, the author explores proposed solutions and attempts to achieve harmony between trade and the environment.
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3WILL THE WTO TURN GREEN?
THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING OBSERVER STATUS TO MULTILATERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
Richard Skeen †
I. INTRODUCTION
The first attempt to govern international trade resulted in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.1  Environmental issues had not yet emerged in the 
international context, and environmental organizations such as Greenpeace did not exist in 
developed countries at that time.2  The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment introduced 
a new issue into multilateral trade negotiations.3  Environmental issues started to slowly 
penetrate domestic and international policy during the mid-1970s.4  In 1991, the GATT 
contracting parties convened the Working Group on Environmental Measures, which formally 
established environmental issues within the multilateral trading system.5  The emphasis on the 
environment continued at Marrakesh with the formation of the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE).6  However, environmental concerns 
sometimes conflict with the goals of multilateral trade, and these discrepancies have created a 
dispute regarding the relevance and importance of incorporating environmental issues into 
modern trade negotiations.  The two factions (environmentalist and trade purist) have become 
deeply entrenched in the debate over the level of involvement multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEA) should play in the World Trade Organization.
† Jurist Doctorate, University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa Oklahoma, expected graduation May 2005; Bachelor 
of Science, Accounting, the Ohio State University, Columbus Ohio, 2002. The author would like to dedicate this 
comment to his mother Judy Skeen and father Richard Skeen for their love and support, which made this comment 
possible.  
1 See discussion infra Part II.A.
2
 Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the 
WTO’s Treatment of Environmental Matter, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, (2001).
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.
4The WTO Members at the Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar in 2001 committed to 
resolve issues including those regarding trade and the environment by January 1, 2005.7  The 
Doha Ministerial Declaration stresses the significance of clarifying the relationship between 
WTO trade rules and the trade measures contained in MEAs.8  The declaration also pinpoints
both information exchange and the establishment of procedures for granting observer status to 
MEAs as areas of primary concern.9   However, Members failed to reach a consensus at the 
recent Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003, and these important issues were left unresolved.10
This comment addresses whether the WTO should extend permanent observer status to 
multilateral environmental agreements and analyzes the impact of injecting environmental issues 
into the multilateral trading system.  Part II will chronicle the transition from the GATT 
governance of international trade to the formation of the WTO and will also examine the 
influences upon the formation of the Committee on Trade and the Environment and its agenda.  
The discussion in Part III will assess the Committee on Trade and the Environment’s first year of 
progress and will discuss a critical report entitled Special Studies 4: Trade and the Environment.  
Part III will continue with an analysis of the relevant implications of the first four Ministerial 
Conferences.  Part IV will outline the mechanics of the GATT’s anti-discrimination provisions 
and related environmental exceptions.  The discussion of the GATT will be supplemented by an 
analysis of international case law interpreting the environmental exceptions.  Part V will 
investigate the structure and function of the different types of trade provisions contained in 
6 See discussion infra Parts II.B-C.   
7 See WTO Ministerial Conference 4th Sess. Doha, Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 para. 31,32,45 
(Nov. 20 2001) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Doha, Ministerial Declaration].
8 Id. para 31.
9 Id. para. 31. 
10 See WTO Cancún 5th Ministerial Conference, Summary of September 14, 2003, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm, (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) 
[hereinafter Summary of September 14, 2003].
5multilateral environmental agreements and their impact on the multilateral trading system.  Part 
VI will begin with chronological analysis of the struggle to acquire observer status for 
multilateral environmental agreements and will then consider the relevant implications of their 
participation in the WTO proceedings.  Finally, Part VII will explore proposed solutions and 
attempt to achieve harmony between trade and the environment.  
II. THE HISTORY OF THE TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM GATT TO THE WTO
A.  The UN, the ITO, and Birth of GATT
During the 1940s, war caused extensive devastation to economic and domestic 
infrastructures across Europe and Southeast Asia.  This brought about dramatic social, economic 
and political changes throughout the world.  The task of rebuilding dominated national concerns 
and required massive amounts of labor, capital, and materials to traverse international borders.11
In response to these concerns, the United States led an effort to harmonize world economic 
affairs.12  The dilemma of conducting trade efficiently in the postwar economy was discussed at 
Bretton Woods in 1944, and sparked an effort to found an international organization charged 
with the development and coordination of international trade.13
Fifty-one states concerned with postwar political and economic instability formed the 
United Nations (UN) in 1945 and assigned certain focus areas to each of its three councils.14  The 
Economic and Social Council supported the development of an international organization to 
11 See generally MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 
(2003) 1-2.
12 See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS CASES, 
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION O F TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 211-16 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the weaknesses of the bilateral system of negotiating tariffs and the 
related implications of the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and the 1945 Act to Extend the Authority of the 
President Under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930). 
13 See MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 1-9 (analyzing WTO formation, law, policy, and practice).
14 See The UN in Brief, at http://www.un.org/Overview/brief1.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (providing a 
description of the history and formation of the United Nations). 
6conduct multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the UN.15  The UN adopted a 
resolution in 1946 to undertake the formation of the International Trade Organization (ITO).16
The process consisted of several stages, including a pivotal one in Geneva, where the schedules 
of tariff reductions and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were prepared.17  The 
original twenty-two states that wanted to adopt the tariff schedules of the GATT signed the 
“Protocol of Provisional Application” to apply the GATT.18  The agreement became effective on 
January 1, 1948 but the signatories only intended it to govern trade until the ITO Charter could 
be adopted.19  The drafting committee finished the ITO Charter in Havana, Cuba during 1948, 
but it was never adopted by the United States due to strong opposition from the Truman 
Administration and a Republican-controlled Congress.20  The ITO ultimately floundered because 
the United States failed to lend the necessary support, which would have ensured its adoption by 
the rest of major trading nations.21
Although it was only intended to be a temporary solution, the GATT became the default 
instrument for international trade negotiations and regulation for over forty years.22  The drafters 
of the GATT never intended it to serve as an international organization, and consequently it 
suffered from some inherent weaknesses, including the lack of any legal identity or 
organizational structure.23  These failings led to ambiguity about the GATT’s authority and 
ability to regulate trade. 24  Despite the aforementioned flaws, the GATT remained the dominant 
15 MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 1.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 2. 
18 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 213.
19 Id.
20 MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 2. 
21 Id.
22 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 216.
23 Id. at 214-16.
24 Id.
7forum for trade negotiations and fostered eight “rounds” of multilateral trade discussions, which 
lowered tariffs and eliminated other international trade barriers.25
B. The Uruguay Round and the Formation of the WTO
1. The Birth of the WTO 
Globalization of the world economy facilitated the need for a stronger international body 
to not only advance but also govern international trade.26  The contracting parties of the GATT 
met in Marrakesh, Uruguay for a trade round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and hatched 
negotiations that produced several agreements signed on April 15, 1994.27 The summit at 
Marrakesh culminated in the formation of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995.28
The contracting parties drafted the Agreement to form the WTO (WTO Agreement) and four 
annexes:
ANNEX 1
ANNEX 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
. . .
ANNEX 1B:  General Agreements on Trade in Services [GATS] and Annexes
ANNEX 1C:  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS]
ANNEX 2
Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
ANNEX 3
Trade Policy Review Mechanism [TPRM] 
ANNEX 4
Plurilateral Trade Agreements [PTA]29
The organizational structure of the WTO requires that every member state comply with 
each of the aforementioned agreements and annexes.30  The entire text, including agreements and 
annexes, operates as one whole body of law, subject to the exception of Annex 4, which is 
optional.31 The WTO Agreement requires Members to adhere to the entirety of the Uruguay 
25 MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 5.
26 See id. at 1-3. 
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id.
29
 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. (1994) 1125, 1153[hereinafter Final Act].
30 MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 7-8.
31 Id.; see also JACKSON, supra note 12, at 219-20.
8Round text and all subsequent negotiations ending in consensus.32  This greatly departs from the 
GATT system of rules allowing contracting parties to make side agreements or accept the GATT 
in fragments, which became especially problematic at the Tokyo Round.33
However, Annex 4, which originally contained four PTA agreements, is reminiscent of 
the GATT style of governance because Members can choose to opt out of the PTA.34  The PTA 
agreements are either aimed primarily at several countries, or are mainly “hortatory,” and simply 
urge action; however, when the ability to create additions to Annex 4 is considered the possible 
environmental impact becomes evident.35  Annex 4’s departure from the traditional 
organizational structure enables flexibility for the evolution of WTO involvement into 
nontraditional areas while still preserving the rigid structure of the WTO.36  Annex 4 could serve 
as a staging area for environmentally related trade agreements to gain force and support while 
bypassing the inherent obstacles in the Committee on Trade and the Environment and Article 
XX.37
2. The Function of the WTO
The WTO objectives include: (1) facilitating, implementing and administering WTO 
agreements, the Multilateral Trade Agreements and the Plurality Trade Agreements; (2) 
providing a forum for trade negotiation; (3) administering the Dispute Settlement Understanding; 
(4) administering the Trade Policy Review Mechanism; and (5) cooperating with the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other international organizations.38   Unlike the GATT, 
32 See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 219.
33
 Id.
34
 Id. at 220. Only the governmental procurement agreement and the trade in civil aircraft agreement remain in 
force; the bovine meat and dairy products agreements were deleted.  Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220.
38
 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. III, paras.1-5 33 I.L.M. 
1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
9the WTO possesses legal personality39 and a much more powerful dispute resolution system with 
which to accomplish its objectives.40
3. The Organizational Structure
The WTO is organized in a hierarchy of conferences and councils. The Ministerial 
Conference, composed of all WTO Members, is the upper echelon and must meet at least once 
every two years.41  The General Council is also composed of all the Members and meets between 
Ministerial Conference sessions to conduct any pressing administrative functions.42
Furthermore, the General Council discharges the duties of the Trade Review Policy Body and 
also acts as the Dispute Settlement Body, which is composed of both the dispute settlement panel 
and the Appellate Body. 43  The next level in the hierarchy consists of three separate councils that 
must report to the General Council.44  Each council covers one broad area of trade: (1) the Goods 
Council; (2) Services Council; and (3) TRIPS Council.45  The WTO Agreement gives each 
council the ability to create subdivisions, called committees, which deal with more specific 
aspects of the respective broad area of trade, and the committees may be further divided into 
working groups to address specialized issues.46  In addition, several committees (including the 
Committee on Trade and the Environment) do not fall under any of the three councils and answer 
directly to the General Council.47
39 Id. art. VIII, para. 1. 
40 See generally TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: WTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 38 (2nd ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter TRADING] (describing the dispute resolution process as equitable fast, effective, and mutually 
acceptable). When a trade violation is suspected members must submit to the multilateral dispute resolution system 
which is binding.  Unlike GATT, the adoption of WTO enforcement rulings cannot be blocked by the losing party or 
any other member.  Id.
41
 WTO Agreement, supra note 38, art. IV, para. 1.
42 Id. art. IV, para. 2.
43 Id. art. IV, paras. 3-4.
44 Id. art. IV, para. 5.
45 Id.
46 Id. art. IV, para. 6.
47
 WTO Agreement, supra note 38, art. IV, para. 8; see also TRADING supra note 40, at 62.
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C. The Multilateral Trading System Acknowledges Environmental Issues 
1. Establishing the Committee on Trade and the Environment
WTO Members are deeply divided over whether to incorporate environmental issues into 
the multilateral trading system.  Environmentalists and their opponents have struggled with this 
question in the international forum since the 1970s when these issues emerged.48  The perplexing 
question of whether to commingle environmental issues with trade is not easily answered by 
either faction.  Environmentalists are critical of the current multilateral trading regime.  They 
claim that without environmental safeguards trade will generate rampant growth causing 
unsustainable natural resource consumption and waste production.49  Environmentalists are also 
concerned that without environmental protections built into the multilateral trading scheme; trade 
liberalization and market access agreements might trump environmental policy.50  The GATT 
contracting parties have been extremely divided over this issue.51  They agreed to form the 
Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971; however, it was 
not convened for the first time, until twenty years later.52
2. Points of Reference
The Ministers to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negations at Marrakesh 
(Ministers) formally decided on April 14, 1994 to direct the WTO to establish a Committee on 
Trade and the Environment at the General Council’s first meeting.53  The Ministers cited their 
authority to create, and the need for establishing the CTE, by looking to the preamble to the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO:
[R]elations in the field of trade and economic endeavour [sic] should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of 
48 See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 17.
49
 Daniel C. Esty, THE GREENING OF THE GATT 42 (1994). 
50 Id.
51 See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 17.   
52 Id. at 17-19.
53 See Trade and Environment, Decision of April 14, 1994, MTN.TNC/MIN, 33 I.L.M. 1263, 1267 (1994) 
[hereinafter Decision on Trade and Environment]. 
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real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and 
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the 
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.54
The CTE reports directly to the General Council and is open to all members of the 
WTO.55  The Ministers endowed the CTE with autonomy by organizing the committee to 
report directly to the General Council.56  This broadens the CTE’s scope and enables it to 
undertake trade-related issues concerning goods, services, and intellectual property 
without overstepping its organizational constraints.57
3. The Scope of the CTE 
The Ministers had the foresight to initially limit the scope of the CTE’s 
jurisdiction to “trade policies and those trade-related aspects of environmental policies 
which may result in significant trade effects for its members.”58  The Ministers set points 
of reference or limitations, which were intended to preserve the integrity of the WTO 
system by preventing the CTE from addressing issues unrelated to trade.59  The Ministers 
quoted the Trade Negations Committee’s (TNC) Decision of December 15, 1993, which 
established the following guidelines and objectives for the CTE:
(a) to identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, in order to 
promote sustainable development;
(b) to make appropriate recommendations on whether any modifications of the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable and non-
discriminatory nature of the system, as regards, in particular:
[1] the need for rules to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental 
measures, for the promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration to the 
needs of developing countries, in particular those of the least developed among them; and
[2] the avoidance of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective multilateral 
disciplines to ensure responsiveness of the multilateral trading system to environmental 
objectives set forth in Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle 12; and
[3] surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-related aspects of 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55
 WTO Agreement, supra note 38 art. IV, para. 5.
56 See generally id.; See also TRADING supra note 40, at 61-62.
57 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
58
 Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1267.
59 See generally id. at 1268.
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environmental measures which have significant trade effects, and of effective implementation 
of the multilateral disciplines governing those measures.60
The language of the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO in conjunction 
with the TNC Decision provided the CTE with its initial points reference to engage and 
address environmental issues within the WTO.61
4. The CTE’s Agenda 
Initially, the formation of the CTE came from a push by developed nations such as the 
United States and the European Union to both placate environmentalists and subject the recent 
proliferation of environmental regulation62 threatening free trade to greater control under the 
GATT.63  The bifurcation of motivation to establish the CTE led to the balancing of 
North/South64 interests in the agenda items of the committee.65  The Ministers delineated ten 
areas of initial inquiry for the CTE’s agenda:
[1] the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures 
for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements;
[2] the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures 
with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading system;
[3] the relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and:
(a) charges and taxes for environmental purposes
(b) requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards and 
technical regulations, packaging, labelling [sic] and recycling;
[4] the provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements which 
have significant trade effects;
[5] the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system 
60 Id.  The Ministers at Marrakesh chose to refer to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development because 
the language in Principle 12 tracks that of the GATT Article XX and denounces unilateral action in international 
forum.  “States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to 
economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address the problems of environmental 
degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.  Unilateral actions to deal with 
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided.  Environmental 
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should as far as possible, be based on 
international consensus.” Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and 
Development, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (emphasis 
added).
61 See Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1267-68.
62 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
63
 See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 24. 
64
 Developed and developing countries are commonly referred to as the North and the South respectively. The terms 
are used interchangeably through this article.
65
 Shaffer, supra note 2, at 25. 
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and those found in multilateral environmental agreements;
[6] the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing 
countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environmental benefits of 
removing trade restrictions and distortions;
[7] the issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods,
[8] that the Committee on Trade and Environment will consider the work programme envisaged in 
the Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment and the relevant provisions of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights as an integral part of its 
work, within the above terms of reference,
[9] that, pending the first meeting of the General Council of the WTO, the work of the Committee 
on Trade and Environment should be carried out by a Sub-Committee of the Preparatory 
Committee of the World Trade Organization (PCWTO), open to all members of the PCWTO,
[10] to invite the Sub-Committee of the Preparatory Committee, and the Committee on Trade and 
Environment when it is established, to provide input to the relevant bodies in respect of 
appropriate arrangements for relations with inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.66
The Agenda Items are composed of two major categories, including market access and 
linkages between the environment and trade, and a third cluster of state specific concerns.67  The 
market access agenda (items two, three, four, and six) generated a balanced discussion between 
the North and South in committee meetings.68  The discussions on market access, particularly 
those issues related to Agenda Item six, including agriculture and fishing, have led to the 
creation of North and South partnerships.69   Agriculture exporters consisting of the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, India and several South American states joined forces and 
attacked, on environmental grounds, the policies designed to protect domestic producers of the 
European Union (EU) Japan, and Korea.70  Developing countries have become increasingly more 
involved in environmental issues relating to trade by forming alliances with developed nations.71
III. TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE WTO: AN INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT AND 
GUIDANCE FROM THE DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 
A.  The 1996 Report of the Committee on Trade and the Environment
66
 Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1268-69.
67
 Shaffer, supra note 2, at 25. 
68 See id. at 25-29.  Shaffer analyzed working papers submitted by CTE Members through the 1998 sessions, and 
assembled a list categorized by country and agenda item addressed.  Id. 
69 Id. at 30. 
70 Id.
71 Id.
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The Ministers required that the CTE report its findings to the General Council at its first 
meeting, and in November of 1996, the CTE published its first report.72  Members offered many 
proposals in the CTE meetings throughout the first year.  Unfortunately, due to irreconcilable 
viewpoints, Members could not reach a consensus and no actual substantive or procedural 
changes were implemented in the WTO as a result of the report.73  Nevertheless, Members 
intensely debated the drafting of the 1996 Report because it did indicate the CTE’s position on a 
number of controversial topics, which would eventually influence other areas, including dispute 
settlement.74
1. The Dispute Resolution Process
The report recommended that when disputes between Members occur, arising out of their 
responsibilities as parties to a MEA, they should “consider trying to resolve it through the 
dispute settlement mechanisms available under the MEA.”75  The committee feared that the 
exclusive jurisdiction and binding nature of the WTO dispute settlement system may attract 
environmentally related suits that were not the province of the WTO dispute settlement panel.76
The committee’s rationale for deferring to the MEA dispute resolution process also stems from 
the concern to maintain the integrity of the WTO dispute resolution system, which evidences the 
WTO’s reluctance to police environmental issues.77  At this developmental stage supremacy of 
law questions between the WTO and MEAs were uncharted territory, and the CTE wisely 
advised Members not to tread there. 
2.  Extending Observer Status and Increasing Transparency
72
 WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and the Environment, 
WT/CTE/1 para. 1 (Nov. 12 1996) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter CTE, 1996 Report].  
73
 Shaffer, supra note 2, at 37.
74 Id. at 38.
75
 CTE, 1996 Report, supra note 72, para. 178.
76
 WTO Committee on Trade and The Environment, Enhancing Synergies and Mutual Supportiveness of MEAs and 
the WTO, WT/CTE/213 para. 39 (June 12, 2002) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) [hereinafter CTE, 
Enhancing Synergies].
77 See discussion infra  Part V.B; but see discussion infra Part IV.B.
15
Agenda Item one requires the CTE to consider the impact of MEAs, item four relates to 
increasing transparency, and item ten calls for input regarding “arrangements for relations with 
inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.”78
These Agenda Items, in conjunction with Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement set the stage for a 
continuing and expanding involvement of intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and MEAs in the WTO. 79  The 1996 report, in consideration of Agenda 
Item one, made several recommendations, including that “[r]equests from the appropriate bodies 
of MEAs for observer status should be considered . . . . [and t]he CTE should also consider 
extending invitations to appropriate MEA institutions” to participate in debates.80  The CTE 
addressed Agenda Item four and concluded “that no modifications to WTO rules are required to 
ensure adequate transparency for existing trade-related environmental measures”81 but invited 
“other inter-governmental organizations . . . to collect and disseminate additional information on 
the use of trade-related environmental measures.”82  The issue of transparency overlaps with 
Agenda Item ten in which the CTE indicated its intent to “improve public access to WTO 
documentation and to develop communication with NGOs”83 and de-restrict working and non-
working papers.84  The CTE will continue to interact with NGOs to enhance the “accuracy and 
richness of public debate.”85  The CTE also announced that it agreed to extend permanent 
observer status to inter-governmental organizations which previously participated on an ad hoc
78
 Decision on Trade and Environment, supra note 53, at 1269; see also WTO Agreement, supra note 38, art. V, 
para. 1.  “The General Council shall make appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other 
intergovernmental organizations that have responsibilities related to those of the WTO.”  Id.  “The General Council 
may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation  with non-governmental organization 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.”  Id. art. V, para. 2. 
79 See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 220.
80
 CTE, 1996 Report, supra note 72, para. 175.
81
 Id. para. 189.
82 Id. para. 193.  
83 Id. para. 214.
84 Id. para. 215.
85 Id. para. 216.
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basis and also indicated that it would consider the possibility of extending observer status to 
MEAs upon their request and subsequent approval by the General Council.86  The CTE 
recognized that MEAs “can play a positive role in creating clearer appreciation of the mutually 
supportive role of trade and environmental policies.”87
B. WTO/UNEP Joint Report Assesses Trade and the Environment 
The WTO Secretariat released Special Studies 4: Trade and the Environment just weeks 
before the Seattle Ministerial Conference.88  The study assesses the causes of environmental 
degradation which “can often be traced back to various market failures or, equally bad, to policy 
failures.”89   Market failures occur when economic forces of supply and demand do not result in 
optimal outcomes for society because producers and consumers do not consider environmental 
externalities.90  Five case studies in Section II of the study depict market and policy failures, 
showing linkages between trade and the environment in the areas of  “(A) chemical-intensive 
agriculture, (B) deforestation, (C) global warming, (D) acid rain, and (E) overfishing.”91  The 
study lays blame on lack of incentives to curb pollution, the failure to realize the global market 
for preservation of resources, lack of resource management schemes, and government subsidies 
that promote over consumption.92  The study encourages a front-end attack on pollution by 
taxing emissions instead of production.93
86
 CTE, 1996 Report, supra note 72, para. 217.
87 Id.
88 See generally Hakan Nordstrom & Scott Vaughan, World Trade Organization, Special Studies 4: Trade and the 
Environment (1999) http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/environment.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) 
[hereinafter WTO, Special Studies].  When the report was drafted co-author Nordstrom worked for the Economic 
Research and Analysis Division of the WTO and co-author Vaughan was at the Trade Finance Division of the 
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). The report analyzes the causes of environmental degradation, 
linkages between trade and the environment, and relationship between the economic integration, growth and the 
environment.  Id.
89 Id. at 13.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 14. 
92 Id. at 26.
93
 WTO, Special Studies, supra note 88, at 26.
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Furthermore, the study discusses the linkages between trade and the environment in 
Section III.94  Through the use of empirical evidence, the authors determine that capital, labor, 
and availability of natural resources have dominated global trade patterns and that environmental 
standards have had no significant effect on these trends.95  Although, the converse is not true:  
“trade liberalization can harm the local environment in countries with a comparative advantage 
in polluting industries and improve the environment elsewhere.”96  However, the authors argue 
that by combining trade and environmental reforms countries can increase income without 
jeopardizing the environment because excess gains can be diverted to economic policy to abate 
environmental degradation.97
Section IV of the study delves into the inquiry of whether economic integration induces 
states to lower environmental policy.98  Theories such as “eco-dumping,” “competition in 
laxity,” and “race to the bottom” are often exaggerated, and the authors have determined that the 
empirical evidence does not support the contention that direct investment is fleeing developed 
counties for countries with lower environmental standards.99  The authors do qualify the 
contention with individual instances of industrial relocation and compromise of environmental 
standards for competitive purposes.100
Section V of the study indicates that free trade may indirectly promote higher 
environmental standards.101  Relying on the environmental Kuznets curve,102 the authors 
94 See generally id. at 29-34.
95 Id. at 31.
96 Id. at 34.
97 Id.
98 See generally id. at 35-46.
99
 WTO, Special Studies, supra note 88, at 46.
100 Id.
101 See generally id. at 47-58.
102 Id. at 47 n.97.  The Environmental Kuznets Curve describes “the relationship between the level and inequality of 
incomes, which tend to follow an inverted U-shaped relationship.  That is, income inequality tens to be come worse 
as a country grows to of poverty, stabilizing at a middle-income level, and then gradually becoming more equal.”  
Id.
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stipulate that studies show “pollution levels tend to be significantly higher in countries with a 
skewed income distribution, a high level of illiteracy, and few political and civil liberties.”103
Finally, the study’s conclusion acknowledges the global nature of environmental 
problems but downplays the WTO’s ability of handling the environmental concerns and 
discourages Members’ from using trade sanctions for purposes of enforcing environmental 
policy.104  The authors recommend that the WTO take steps to address and remove “trade 
barriers on environmentally-friendly production technologies and environmental services” in 
order to lower costs of direct investment in those technologies.105  They also call for a reduction 
in energy, agricultural and fishing subsidies, which promote the overcapitalization of 
resources.106
C.  The WTO Ministerial Conferences
After the CTE presented its initial report to the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 
1996107 the WTO, in accordance with its bylaws, held another Ministerial Conference in Geneva 
in 1998 that initiated a round of trade negotiations.108  However, in 1999 due to extensive rioting, 
the Seattle Ministerial Conference was canceled and failed to give rise to another trade round of 
eagerly anticipated discussions on agriculture, investment, and the environment.109
After the failed attempt at Seattle, the next major advance to the CTE’s agenda came at 
the Doha Ministerial Conference in November of 2001.110  Director-General Moore, of the 
WTO, termed the Ministerial Declaration the “Doha Development Agenda” to emphasize the 
103
 Id. at 57.
104 WTO, Special Studies, supra note 88, at 59.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See CTE, 1996 Report, supra note 72, para. 1.
108 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
109 See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1-3.
110 See generally Doha, Ministerial Declaration, supra note 7 (addressing the WTO’s agenda and issues including 
market access, industrial tariffs, anti-dumping rules, subsidies, regional trade agreements, implementation issues, 
agriculture, intellectual property, and the environment). 
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focus on developing countries.111  The Ministerial Declaration’s section on trade and 
environment agrees to negotiate:
(i) the relationship between existing WTO Rules and specific trade obligations set out in 
multilateral environmental agreement (MEAs).  The negotiations shall be limited in scope 
to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.  
The negotiations shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to 
the MEA in question;
(ii) procedures for regular information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant 
WTO committees, and the criteria for granting of observer status;
(iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
environmental goods and services.112
The Ministerial Declaration further instructed the CTE to pay particular attention to 
several focus areas while maintaining its current terms of reference.113  First, the CTE 
must study “the effect of environmental measures on market access” while focusing on 
developing countries and least developed countries, and identify situations where 
reducing or eliminating trade barriers, “would benefit trade, the environment and 
development.”114  The Doha Ministerial Declaration mandates that the CTE also address 
the TRIPS agreement and labeling requirements for environmental purposes.115
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES IN GATT AND THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION BODY’S IMPACT 
ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A.  Article XX Exceptions  
In addition to the reference to environmental concerns in the Preamble to the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO, the GATT also has several environmental safeguards woven into various 
exceptions clauses.116
1. The Nondiscrimination Provisions
111
 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 1222.
112 Doha, Ministerial Declaration, supra note 7, para. 31.
113 Id. para. 32.
114 Id. para. 32 pt., i. 
115 Id. para. 32 pts. ii, iii.
116 See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XX (Oct. 30, 1947), 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal/gatt47_e.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2003) 
[hereinafter GATT].
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Annex 1 A to the WTO Agreement contains GATT 1994 which is a series of 
amendments and understandings on the interpretation of certain provisions of the original version 
of GATT 1947.117  The multilateral trading system strives for nondiscrimination based upon two 
fundamental concepts: the most favored nation (MFN) principal and the national treatment 
principal.118  The MFN, found in Article I of GATT, prohibits applying different tariff schedules 
for the same product to different Members, by requiring that “any advantage, favour [sic], 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or designed 
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product 
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”119  Article III of 
GATT contains the national treatment clause, which “acts to reinforce the tariff bindings made 
pursuant to Article II by limiting the circumstances in which it is permissible for a nation to 
provide treatment for domestic goods in its national legislation and programs which is more 
favorable than that for imported goods . . . .”120  The relevant portion of Article III states that 
“products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal 
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products.”121  Article XI restricts discrimination in the form of non-tariff barriers (NTB):
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export license or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by 
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting 
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other 
contracting party.122
117
 Final Act, supra note 29, at 1154-55, 1167.
118 P. W. BIRINE & A. E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 699 (2nd ed., 2002) [hereinafter 
BIRNIE & BOYLE].
119
 GATT, supra note 116, art. I para. (1).  GATT 1994 states that “[t]he references to ‘contracting party’ in the 
provisions of GATT 1994 shall now be deemed to read ‘Member.’”  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
Annex 1 A, para. 2 (a), (Apr. 15, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).
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 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 480.
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2.  The “Environmental” Exception of GATT
Article I, III, and XI interact with each other, preventing almost every conceivable 
discriminatory tactic.123 However, some discriminatory trade regulations will qualify for 
exceptions.  Article XX implicitly allows limited environmental exemptions for violations 
occurring under Articles I, III, and XI.124
Article XX is composed of two main parts, the introductory clause (chapeau) and the list 
of exceptions detailing the article’s scope.125  The chapeau to Article XX allows for the adoption 
and enforcement of domestic laws that are discriminatory if they are within the article’s scope, 
“[s]ubject to the requirement that measures are not applied . . . [arbitrarily or amount to] 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or . . . 
disguised [as a] restriction on international trade . . . .”126  The relevant scope of Article XX 
includes measures in paragraph (b) that are “necessary to protected human, animal or plant life or 
health”127 and those in paragraph (g) “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”128
B.  Case Study: Environmental Exceptions to GATT 
Discriminatory domestic legislation claimed to be exempt from Articles I, III, or XI must 
pass muster under Article XX.129  The GATT panels and the WTO Appellate Body interpreted 
Article XX on several occasions, leading to a consistent and reliable reading of the terms 
contained within paragraphs (b) and (g).130  The paragraph (b) analysis deals mainly with 
123 See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 118, at 700.
124
 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 479; see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 118, at 701.
125
 JACKSON, supra note 12, at 532.
126
 GATT, supra note 116, art. XX
127 Id. art. XX para. b. 
128 Id. art. XX para. g. 
129 See generally JACKSON, supra note 12, at 532.
130 See MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 451-52.
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construing the word “necessary.”131  The paragraph (g) inquiry must first focus on whether the 
trade measure involves the “conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.”132  Second, if the 
panel determines that it is a conservation measure, the panel then must then decide weather the 
measure is “relating to” the conservation.133  Third, the panel must determine whether the 
legislation aimed at foreigners works “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption.”134  The three main issues concerning paragraph (g) were addressed first in the 
Tuna Dolphin cases and then refined in the United States – Reformulated Gasoline case and the
Shrimp Turtle case.135
1. The Tuna Dolphin Cases : Reconciling Environmental Measures with the 
GATT
a. Tuna Dolphin I
The United States imposed a unilateral ban in accordance with the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMPA) upon the importation of yellowfin tuna products that killed an 
unacceptable quantity of dolphins during harvesting.136  Mexican fishermen were adversely 
affected by the import restrictions, and in 1991, Mexico filed a grievance with the GATT 
alleging violations of Articles III, XI, and XIII.137  The United States countered the Article III 
attack by maintaining that the restrictive actions were justified under the national treatment 
clause because United States fishermen were subject to the same regulations as the Mexican 
fishermen.138  The GATT panel concluded that the MMPA regulations did not apply to tuna 
131 See id. at 452.
132 Id. at 451.
133 Id. at 452.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 451. 
136 See generally Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411- 1418 (2003) (describing findings of congress, 
authorization of Secretary of State to regulate the tuna fishing industry, and prohibitions relating to the incidental 
taking of dolphins during tuna fishing); see also United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, para. 2.7, DS21/R-
39S/155, Sept. 3, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin I]. 
137 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 136, para. 3.1.  
138
 Id. paras. 3.6, 3.7.
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products within the meaning of Article III (which applies only to the imported product itself and 
not the production process) and were therefore mere regulations on tuna harvesting that had no 
effect on tuna as a product.139  Furthermore, the panel noted that the MMPA regulations 
amounted to discriminatory trade measures because domestic and foreign vessels were subject to 
different regulatory schemes.140  Domestic vessels were given arbitrary preset limit on dolphin 
kills, but the allowable dolphin kills for foreign vessels were based on a percentage of dolphin 
kills by domestic vessels for the present year.141  Consequently, foreigners did not know their 
allowable kill limit until after harvest.142
(1).  The “necessary” Clause of Article XX (b)
The United States argued that the regulations of the MMPA were justified under the 
Article XX paragraph (b) or alternatively XX paragraph (g) exceptions.143  The panel’s analysis 
undertook the inquiry of whether the word “necessary” in the GATT Article XX section (b) 
applied to measures taken to protect resources outside the borders of a nation if no reasonable 
alternative exists.144  Furthermore, the panel concluded that while Article XX does not expressly 
limit the exception to domestic action, the United States’ regulation did not merit a Article XX 
exception because there were other multilateral options that remained as possible solutions that 
would be less abrasive to GATT.145
(2).  The “relating to” Clause of Article XX (g)
The Panel then moved to an analysis of the GATT Article XX paragraph (g).146  Focusing 
on the language “relating to,” the panel cited previous decisions that construed the term to mean, 
139
 Id. para. 5.10.
140 Id. paras. 5.16, 5.33.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Tuna Dolphin I, supra note 136, para. 5.22.
144 Id. para. 5.24.
145 Id. paras. 5.25, 5.28, 5.29, 5.33.
146 Id. para. 5.30.
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“primarily aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible resource.147  The panel ultimately 
decided that the contested measures were not allowed under Article XX paragraph (g) either.148
(3).  Conclusion
The panel’s decision, while it did not uphold a unilateral embargo, ultimately benefited 
the dolphin population by promoting a multilateral approach to conservation and regulation.149
Subsequent to the adjudication of the first Tuna Dolphin case the United States and Mexico 
entered into the Agreement for the Reductions of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean 
in 1992, which establishes declining a per-vessel limit on dolphin kills and requires observers on 
large purse-seine tuna vessels.150  The Agreement also created a research foundation, which 
engages in programs to develop new fishing techniques to lessen and eventually eliminate 
dolphin mortality.151
b.  Tuna Dolphin II
The panel subsequently revisited the dispute in 1994 when the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the Netherlands challenged the validity of secondary embargoes, on 
processors of tuna caught by vessels not complying with the MMPA rules, and alleged them to 
be contrary to Articles III and XI.152  The United States justified the regulations, termed 
“intermediary nation embargoes,” under Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions.153  Again, the panel 
reiterated that Article III was not applicable since the regulations were directed at harvesting and 
not the product itself.154  The panel then concluded that the ban on imports constituted a 
147 Id. paras. 5.30-5.33.
148 Id. para. 5.34.
149
 See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures to Resolve Trade-Environment Disputes, 22 
WM. & MAR Y ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 431-33 (1998).
150 Id. at 432-33.
151 Id. at 433.
152 See United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, para. 3.1, June 16, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 
(1994) (unadopted) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin II].  
153 Id. para. 3.2.
154 Id. para. 5.9.
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prohibition or restriction, which was inconsistent with Article XI.155  The panel then applied 
Article XX (g) and outlined an important three step analysis:
First, it had to be determined whether the policy in respect of which these provisions were invoked 
fell within the range of policy to conserve exhaustible resources.
Second, it had to be determined whether the measure for which the exception was being invoked . 
. . was “related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and whether it was made 
effective “in conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Third, it had to be determined whether the measure was applied in conformity with the 
requirement set out in the preamble to article XX . . . .156
Concerning the first question, the panel noted that anything capable of potential exhaustion 
constituted a resource.157  This is an important ruling in respect to Article XX (g).  The panel’s 
broad interpretation of Article XX includes, as exceptions, policies protecting almost anything 
natural (coal, trees, water, dolphins etc.) provided that the policy is not dependant on whether 
present stocks of the resource are depleted,158 regardless of whether the resource is located 
beyond a nation’s borders.159  The panel affirmed that previous interpretations of the term  
“relating to” meant “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural resources, and that the term 
“in conjunction with” implied “primarily aimed at” promulgating regulations on domestic 
production and consumption.160  The panel then applied Article XX (b) using the same three step 
analysis above and substituted the relevant portions for “protect human, animal or plant life or 
heath.”161  The panel found that the restrictions were not justified under Article XX (g) or (b).162
2. Reformulated Gasoline
a. Introduction
The Clean Air Act of 1990 established two regulation programs regarding the 
importation of foreign gasoline and domestic sales of gasoline in various areas based 
155 Id. para. 5.10.
156 Id. para. 5.12.
157 Id. para. 5.13.
158 Tuna Dolphin II, supra note 152, para. 5.13
159 Id. para. 5.16
160 Id. para. 5.22.
161 Id. para. 5.29.
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upon the areas’ pollution levels.163  The first program applies to ozone “nonattainment 
areas” and only allows sale of reformulated gasoline in those districts.  Locations with 
extremely high levels of ozone pollution (generally large cities) or those areas that have 
opted in by request of their state governor are designated as “nonattainment areas.”164
The second program is applicable to areas that have not experienced high levels of air 
pollution, which includes the rest of the United States.165  The second program permits 
the sale of conventional gasoline in any location not designated a “nonattainment” 
area.166  The act establishes a separate toxic emission allowance for each refiner and 
blender based on the classification of either reformulated or conventional gasoline using 
1990 as the base year for emission levels.167
Brazil and Venezuela filed a compliant with the WTO Dispute Resolution Body 
alleging that the regulations promulgated by the Untitled States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) pursuant to the Clean Air Act violated Article I and III of the GATT.168
The complaint was based upon the disparity of treatment between foreign and domestic 
refiners regarding the availability of methods for computing an individual baseline, which 
determines allowable levels of pollutants contained in the gasoline.169  Domestic refiners 
were allowed three different methods of computation before they were required to use the 
statutory baseline whereas foreign refiners were allowed to use only the first method and 
162 Id. para. 5.27, 5.39.
163See generally Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2003).
164
 WTO, Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R at 5 (April 29, 1996) available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter 
Reformulated Gasoline]; see also Clean Air Act of 1990, supra note 163, para. (k).
165 Id.
166 Id. 
167
 Clean Air Act of 1990, supra note 163, para. (k) parts (2), (3), (8).
168 See generally Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164.
169 Id. at 4-5. 
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then forced to accept the statutory baseline developed by the EPA.170  Ultimately the 
panel held in favor of Brazil and Venezuela, concluding that the EPA regulations were 
not consistent with Article III (4) and could not be justified under either paragraphs (b) 
(d) or (g) of Article XX.171  However, the panel did conclude that clean air was an 
exhaustible resource, which is a limited victory for environmentalists.172  The United 
States appealed the ruling to the Appellate Body, which affirmed the panel discussion but 
on different grounds, establishing a new framework analysis for Article XX 
exceptions.173
b. The “relating to” Clause of Article XX (g) 
The Appellate Body first proceeded to determine whether the “measure” was 
“related to” conservation under Article XX paragraph (g).174  The term “measures” as 
used in Article XX refers the specific provision of a rule which conflicts with Article III 
due to the lack of an even application between domestic and foreign production and 
consumption, not necessarily because of an unequal treatment.175  The Appellate Body 
interpreted the chapeau to Article XX to mean that the conflicting measure (not the legal 
determination of unfavorable) must be analyzed, and it ruled that that panel had erred 
here in its analysis.176  The Appellate Body agreed with the panel’s interpretation of 
“relating to” as meaning “primarily aimed at” the “conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources” but cautioned that it is not to be used as the ultimate “litmus test” for 
170 Id. at 8-10.
171 Id. at 11.
172 Id. at 13; see also Kennedy, supra note 149, at 442.  “In a critical concession to the United States, the panel 
agreed that even though air was a renewable resource if adequate pollution abatement controls were put in place 
(unlike for example fossil fuels), that did not preclude it from being an exhaustible natural resource for purposes of 
Article XX (g).”  Id.
173 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 49, 63-66
174 Id. at 15. 
175 Id. at 24.
176 Id. at 31.
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compliance with Article XX.177  However, the Appellate body disagreed with the panel’s 
application of Article XX (g) and concluded that the United States’ measurers were 
“primarily aimed” at the conservation of natural resources due to the Clean Air Act’s 
dependence upon on the Gasoline Rule to achieve its objectives.178
c.  The “in conjunction with” Clause of Article XX (g) 
Once the “measure” is deemed as being “relating to” conservation, the panel must 
then assess whether it operates “in conjunction with” domestic restrictions.179  The panel 
indicated that “in conjunction with” may be read as “together with” or “jointly with” 
domestic regulations on production or consumption of natural resources.180  The 
Appellate Body concluded that since the restrictions on domestic gasoline are established 
concurrently with imported gasoline, the regulatory scheme satisfies the requirements of 
“in conjunction with” and the fact that they are unequal is irrelevant.181  Moreover, if the 
regulations were required to be identical there would be no dispute under Article III and 
therefore no need for an exception under Article XX.182
d. The Chapeau Analysis
After the regulation is determined to fall within the domain of Article XX (g) the 
next level of analysis concerns the chapeau’s prohibition of exceptions that evidence “(a) 
‘arbitrary discrimination’ (between countries where the same conditions prevail); (b) 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ (with the same qualifier); or (c) ‘disguised restriction’ on 
international trade.”183  The Appellate body attempted resolve the debate as to whether 
the phrase  “between countries where the same conditions prevail” concerns “conditions 
177 Id. at 37.
178 Id. at 38-39.
179 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 39-45. 
180 Id. at 41-42
181 Id. at 43-44.
182 Id.
183 Id. at  49.
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in importing and exporting countries, or only to conditions in exporting countries.”184
The phrase was determined to imply application to all GATT Articles, contradicting 
previous GATT panel decisions interpreting it as only referring to the MFN principle of 
Article I.185  The Appellate body found that several alternate measures existed, which 
were equally available and less discriminatory and held that the Gasoline Rule was both a 
“disguised restriction” and an “unjustifiable discrimination” on trade.186
The Appellate Body developed a novel approach to analyzing and resolving 
Article XX disputes in Reformulated Gasoline.187  The Appellate Body shifted away from 
the narrow construction of the enumerated paragraphs of Article XX and expanded the 
scope of the constraints.188  Thus, thrusting the crux of the analysis back to the chapeau, 
which allows Article XX exceptions as long as they are not a “unjustifiable 
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction” on trade.189  The new approach appears to 
allow more exceptions into GATT including environmental measures that fall under 
Article XX paragraphs (b) and (g) as long as there are no less discriminatory means to 
accomplish the same ends.190
3. The Shrimp Turtle Case
The Shrimp Turtle case raises some of the same issues as Tuna Dolphin I and II
and comes to relatively similar conclusions.  However, the real importance of this case is 
the submission of unsolicited amicus briefs by various NGOs in defense of the United 
States’ ban on the importation of shrimp by fisherman who failed to use turtle excluder 
184 Id  at 50.
185 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 50-51; see also Kennedy, supra note 149, at 446 n.404.
186 Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 164, at 63.  
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devices to protect endangered species of turtle.191  The case is also noted for the 
Appellate Body’s articulation and sequencing of the Article XX analysis.192
The original panel held that only information, which the panel seeks may be 
considered.193  It also held in favor of Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand that section 609 
United States of Public Law 101-162, requiring the use of turtle excluder devices, was in 
violation of the article XI: 1 of GATT and did not warrant an exception under Article 
XX.194
a. Non-Member Submissions
Several NGOs including the Center for Marine Conservation, the Center for 
International Environmental Law, and the World Wide Fund for Nature submitted briefs 
to the panel and to both of the parties.195  The panel initially declined to consider the 
briefs because they were not requested by the panel.196  The panel reasoned that allowing 
the submission would aggravate the dispute resolution process according to Article 13 of 
the Dispute Resolution Understanding (DSU), but invited either party to include any 
information in their own briefs.197  Upon appeal, the Appellate Body concluded that the 
panel is only legally required to accept information from the parties to a dispute and 
interested third party Members.198  It also noted that panel has no obligation to consider 
unrequested outside information.199  However, the Appellate Body found the panel’s 
conclusion (that the panel may consider only information that is sought) was an overly 
191 Id. at 461-62.
192
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narrow interpretation of Article 13 paragraph 2 of the DSU, which states that “[p]anels 
may seek information from any relevant source.”200  The Appellate Body reasoned that 
when Article 13 of the DSU is read in conjunction with Articles 11 and 12 of the DSU, it 
allows the panel discretion to accept and consider unrequested information submitted by 
non-members.201
b. The Article XX Exceptions
Furthermore, the Appellate Body cited the panel’s error to correctly sequence the 
Article XX analysis of the disputed regulation.202  The Appellate Body criticized the 
panel for moving directly to the chapeau of Article XX, thereby forgoing a classification 
of the exception under one of the Article XX paragraphs.203  The Appellate Body 
reiterated the standard two-tiered analysis as defined in Reformulated Gasoline: (1) 
determine whether the violation falls under one the enumerated categories outlined in the 
paragraphs following Article XX and (2) evaluate the measure under the constraints of 
the chapeau.204  Sequencing the analysis in this order allows the panel flexibility in its 
determination of what “measures” constitute a “unjustifiable discrimination” or 
“disguised restrictions on trade” depending upon what paragraph the exception may fall 
under.205  The panel explains that what may constitute an unacceptable level of 
discrimination for a measure relating to protection of public morals may be completely 
different than that for a measurer pertaining to products of prison labor.206
4. Conclusion 
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Each of the aforementioned cases played a distinct role in establishing a sound 
foundation for the analysis of Article XX exceptions.207  The Dispute Resolution Body 
has increased the possibility of sustaining environmental exceptions by establishing a 
regiment for the application of Article XX, which requires the categorization of 
exceptions and then the application of the chapeau.208  Furthermore, the Appellate Body 
articulated a balanced approach to the issue of submissions when extended latitude to 
NGOs and MEAs by providing that they may request to submit amicus briefs to the 
Dispute Resolution Body on behalf of environmental issues, but then granted the panel 
discretion to accept or reject the submissions.209
MEAs that have been granted observer status in the CTE may be better positioned 
than other NGOs, to influence a dispute resolution panel’s decision to allow unsolicited 
submissions, because of their increased access to the WTO process. 210  Moreover, the 
impact of extending observer status to MEAs is compounded because of the potential 
impact on international law.  The dispute settlement panels, claimants, and respondents 
have all cited reports from the CTE.211  Regular participation by MEAs in CTE meetings 
would garner influence for environmental constituencies in international law by directly 
impacting reports and policies that are cited in binding WTO dispute resolution panel 
decisions.
207 See Matsushita, supra note 11, at 451. 
208 See Shrimp – Turtle, supra note 192, para. 185.  “We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the 
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209 See generally id. paras. 99-110.
210
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V. TRADE RELATED RESTRICTIONS IN MEAS AND THEIR IMPACT UPON THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM
A.   Trade Measure or Trade Related? 
According to statistics released by the WTO and UNEP only 38 MEAs, a small 
fraction of the 238 currently in force, have trade related provisions.212  There are also 
other MEAs not included in the above tally, which impose notable effects upon trade 
because of the overarching effect of the regulations within the treaty, not the manner in 
which they are enforced.213
MEAs without specific trade measures can still affect the multilateral trading 
system indirectly.214  These treaties contain no restrictive trade measures but still create 
waves in the pool of international trade by raising compliance costs.  For example, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol 
impacts trade in consumer goods, industrial products, and fossil fuels by regulating 
greenhouse gas emissions.215
B.  The Structure and Impact of MEA Trade Measures  
Trade Measures in MEAs can appear in several formats: (1) reporting 
requirements; (2) labeling requirements; (3) notification and consent procedures; (4) 
import and/or export bans; and (5) taxes or government procurement.216  In the debate 
over conflicting WTO and MEA trade measures, it is generally not acknowledged that 
MEAs bundle trade regulations with positive measures to mitigate the potential effect on 
212
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trade and actually stimulate development.217  These trade measures are commonly linked 
with other non-trade devices, such as technical or financial assistance, to create an 
optimal outcome through a balanced approach.218  The CTE encourages environmentally 
friendly technology transfer but fails to address the problem of underfunding that plagues 
MEAs, which thwarts the availability of positive measures and requires the continuation 
of trade measures.219  In fact, the CTE notes that effective MEAs support the multilateral 
trading system by both addressing “environmental problems of concern to the 
international community” and preventing “disputes from arising” within the WTO.220
MEA trade measures could potentially conflict with the GATT rules.221  The CTE 
encourages the use of positive measures to either reduce or replace trade measures.222
While positive measures are becoming increasingly more common in MEAs, due to 
underfunding and lack of multilateral support from developing countries in the area of 
technology transfer, it seems that MEA trade measures are not going to dissipate any time 
soon.223  When a dispute arises between WTO Members, stemming from their obligations 
under a MEA, the CTE prefers that the parties use the environmental treaty’s dispute 
resolution process, rather than filing a complaint with the WTO dispute resolution 
panel.224  However, this does not address the problem of a dispute arising between WTO 
Members when one Member is a party to the MEA from which the dispute arises and the 
217 See Hoffman, supra note 212, at 6.
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other Member is not a party to the MEA.225  This scenario has not yet materialized, 
although, it has sparked heated debate and raised many concerns and questions regarding 
the supremacy of GATT versus MEAs in the context of international law.226  Fortunately, 
the debate over supremacy appears to becoming a moot point due to the proliferation of 
membership in MEAs, which on average outnumbers that of WTO membership.227  The 
party/non-party debate continues to be an issue with the United States, which has recently 
backed out of the Kyoto Protocol and is a non-party to several other MEAs.228
VI. EXTENDING OBSERVER STATUS TO MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENT AGREEMENTS: THE 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
A. What is Observer Status?
Since 1997, the CTE has generally held three meetings per year with additional 
special sessions and symposia.229  The WTO has granted invitee status to UNEP and six 
MEAs to participate in several of the CTE’s special sessions.230  Requests for observer 
status to a particular WTO body, such as the CTE, are granted on a case-by-case or ad 
hoc basis.231  Organizations can also be granted observer status by invitation on a case-
by-case basis.232  Observers enjoy only limited privileges in WTO sessions.  They may 
speak if invited to do so, but that invitation does not include the right to circulate papers, 
which can only be granted by an additional specific invitation.233  Furthermore, observers 
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are allowed to receive papers which are circulated, but they are expressly prohibited from 
participating in the decision making process.234
B. A Chronological Analysis of the Role MEAs in the WTO
1. 1996: The Beginning 
The CTE embarked upon a course of action that would lead to the enhanced 
information exchange and communication between the WTO and outside constituencies 
by extending observer status to fourteen IGOs in 1996.235  The CTE also granted observer 
status, in 1996, to several IGOs on an ad hoc basis, subject to final approval by the 
General Council.236  However, this ad hoc  approach is an ineffective solution because it 
does not allow the CTE to take full advantage of the MEA’s expertise in international 
environmental law.237
2. 1997-1998: The WTO Grants Limited Observer Status to MEAs and 
Discusses Linkages
After the initial report was issued in 1996, the CTE developed a “cluster 
approach” for subsequent years to better deal with the themes of market access (Agenda 
Items 2, 3, and 4) and linkages between trade and the environment (Agenda Items 1, 5, 7, 
and 8). 238  Discussion topics for the year are determined at the last regular meeting of the 
234 Id. ANNEX 3, paras. 8-9.
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previous year and are usually based upon several of the Agenda Items set out in the 
Decision on Trade and the Environment and sometimes focus on a specific theme.239
The CTE extended observer status to three non-governmental organizations in 
1997.240  Furthermore, the WTO made a landmark move by granting ad hoc observer 
status two environmental conventions: the UN Framework Convention on Biological 
Diversity  (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES).241
The July 1998 meeting of the CTE focused on linkages between trade and the 
environment and sponsored an Information Session with the Secretariats of several MEAs.242
The meeting improved the information exchange between groups by disseminating information 
to Members regarding developments in multilateral environmental agreements, which were 
relevant to the CTE.243  The CTE also extended ad hoc observer status to the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and the International Plant Genetic Resource Institute that year.244
Several major developments occurred during the following year, including more grants of 
observer status and a symposium involving the relationship between MEAs and the WTO.245
3. 1999:  The WTO’s High Level Symposium 
The CTE continued to expand on the information exchange between the WTO and MEAs 
in 1999.246   It held another Information Session with the Secretariats of five MEAs in which 
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their representatives were invited to submit papers and give presentations.247   The session 
focused on sustainable development, and one theme involved learning how trade measures in 
MEAs work.248  Armed with this information, the CTE hoped to foster a better understanding of 
the MEA’s role within the multilateral trading system.249  In addition, the CTE extended ad hoc
observer status to several more NGOs and the UNFCCC in 1999.250
The WTO held a symposium on trade and the environment in Geneva during March of 
1999.251  The symposium covered a variety of trade related issues and formed three panels which 
held specialized discussions on: (1) linkages between trade and environment polices; (2) 
synergies between trade liberalization, environmental protection, and sustainable development; 
and (3) interaction between trade and environment.252  Klaus Töpfer, Executive Director of 
UNEP emphasized a holistic approach to dealing with international environmental issues.253  He 
declared that the impacts of debt, poverty, technology transfer, and sustainable development 
could not be isolated from environmental issues.254  Töpfer also stressed that the WTO could not 
assume the entire responsibility alone and pledged to increase UNEP’s role in the multilateral 
trading system.255
4. A New Millenium:  Increased UNEP Involvement and Clarification of MEA Dispute 
Resolution, Technical Assistance, and Capacity Building
247 Id. para. 3. The CTE received presentations and papers from: CITES;  “the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer [Montreal Protocol]; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC]; the Intergovernmental Forum on Forest [IFF]; and the International Tropical Timber Organization 
[ITTO].” Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. para. 4. The CTE extended observer status to: “the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas [ICCAT]; the Islamic Development Bank; the South Pacific Forum; the South Asian Fisheries Development 
Centre.”  CTE, 1999 Report, supra note 246, para. 4. 
251 See International Institute for Sustainable Development, Report on the WTO’s High-Level Symposium on Trade 
and the Environment, (Mar. 15-16, 1999) http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct. 21, 2003).
252 Id.
253
 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. 
39
The CTE held two information sessions with the secretariats of MEAs in 2000.256  The 
first MEA Information Session took place in July and covered trade related developments.257
The session consisted of presentations and papers, which discussed the linkages between 
upcoming WTO trade program agendas and MEAs.258  The Director-General of the WTO and 
the Executive Director of UNEP both participated in the second information session held in 
October.259  The presence of both directors signaled a firm resolution by both the WTO and 
UNEP to continue to interact with MEAs and nurture the relationships between all three 
factions.260  The second session, which also spawned papers and presentations from MEAs,261
helped to increase the understanding of the relationships within the CTE by identifying 
“synergies” and enhancing  “mutual supportiveness.”262  Furthermore, the sessions provided an 
opportunity to develop and enhance institutional bonds between the Secretariats of the MEAs, 
UNEP and the WTO. 263
The CTE’s June 2001 meeting began with another Information Session with MEA 
Secretariats, this time to heighten the understanding of the dispute settlement measures and 
compliance provisions within MEAs and the WTO.264  The WTO, UNEP, and MEAs 
collaborated to produce a background document which outlined the compliance and dispute 
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resolution provisions in each of the following MEAs: the UNFCCC; the Montreal Protocol; the 
Basel Convention; the Rotterdam Convention; the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (Stockholm Convention); the CBD; the UNFSA; and the CITES.265  This session 
provided a forum in which the WTO, UNEP, and MEA Secretariats could network, develop 
linkages, and promote synergy between all of the different entities.266
The next CTE Information Session with the MEA Secretariats was held in June 2002 and 
focused on technical assistance, capacity building, and information exchange.267 The MEA 
representatives contributed to the meeting by presenting their current technical assistance and 
capacity building activities.268 UNEP distributed a paper at the June 2002 meeting, on how to 
“enhance synergies and mutual supportiveness” between “trade and environmental policies, rules 
and institutions.”269  The report circulated by UNEP emphasized the need to increase institutional 
cooperation and called for both more formal and informal interaction between the WTO and 
MEAs.270  UNEP underscored the value of granting observer status to MEAs, in various WTO 
bodies including the CTE, which it opined would thereby increase information exchange and 
foster more efficient cooperation.271  UNEP bolstered the argument to extend observer status to 
MEAs by recalling that several of their Secretariats participated regularly in annual information 
sessions and offered papers and statements to the CTE.272  The report further postulated that 
increased information exchange, with regard to each group’s dispute settlement process, would 
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assist in creating a deeper understanding of objectives and compliance mechanisms within 
MEAs.273  UNEP lobbied on behalf of the Convention on Biological Diversity to urge the WTO 
to approve its request for observer status in the Committee on Agriculture and the TRIPS 
Council by claiming that the move would help identify linkages and promote cooperation.274
Moreover, UNEP noted that each of the ten CTE Agenda Items contained biodiversity related 
issues.275  Therefore, granting observer status to the CBD Secretariat would enhance the WTO by 
providing a level of expertise in the area of biodiversity.  
5. 2003: Cancún and Beyond
The CTE confirmed the appointment of its new chairman, Ambassador Peter Bro, in 
February of 2003.276  Several other developments occurred that year, including a symposium, the 
circulation of various documents, and the release of CTE’s report to the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún.277  In 2003, the committee focused mainly on market access, the TRIPS 
agreement, and environmental labeling requirements.278  It did not admit any more MEAs or 
even address the observer status of institutions, which were still pending the General Council’s 
approval.279
The WTO held a Symposium on the Challenges ahead on the Road to Cancún in mid-
June of 2003, which devoted several sessions to primarily environmental concerns.280  The first 
session began when the mediator, Mr. Richard Tarasofsky, facilitated a discussion on Paragraph 
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31 (i) of the Doha Development Agenda.281  He indicated that the relationship between the WTO 
and MEAs was particularly problematic.282  Tarasofsky also accused WTO members of avoiding 
the issue of MEA party/non-party conflicts within the WTO and admonished Members for not 
addressing non-specific trade measures contained within MEAs.283  Tarasofsky charged both the 
WTO and MEAs with the responsibility of address the chilling effect of WTO policy on MEA 
development.284
The Fifth Ministerial Conference began in Cancún, Mexico on September 10, 2003, and 
negotiations lasted through September 15, 2003.285  The Doha Development Agenda continued 
to dominate the negotiations with an emphasis on least developed countries.286  The Conference 
separated in to different focus groups including one on “other issues” which housed the 
negotiations on trade and the environment.287  On day two of the Conference, the talks focused 
on granting observer status to MEAs, eco-labeling, and the relation between TRIPS, the CBD, 
and protection of traditional knowledge.288  The following day, the negotiations continued to 
expand and near consensus upon issues dealing with relationships between TRIPS paragraph 
27.3 and the Doha Declaration paragraph 19 (relating to the patenting of plants and animals, the 
CBD, and traditional knowledge).289  However, on day four, the Chairperson Ernesto Derbez 
sensed the potentially irreconcilable differences on the Singapore and Agricultural Issues and 
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warned the conference of the looming deadline for consensus.290  Unfortunately, the Cancún 
Fifth Ministerial Conference ended on September 14, 2003 without the Members reaching a 
consensus.291
The inability of Members’ to reach a consensus at Cancún does not spell failure for the 
issues presented in the Doha Development Agenda.  Fortunately, as Mr. Derbez noted Cancún 
was not a launching nor a concluding round, and the Members still have until January 1, 2005 to 
reconcile differences on the difficult issues.292  While the deadline approaches, Members still 
must reach a consensus on (1) “clarifying the existing relationships between existing WTO rules 
and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral environmental agreements;” (2) information 
exchange between the WTO and MEAs; (3) “the criteria for granting observer status;” and (4) 
“the liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services.”293
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Where Do We Go After Cancún?
Several theorists have suggested the creation of a World Environmental Organization 
(WEO) to coordinate MEAs and provide a consolidated forum to regulate environmental 
degradation.  Scholars such as Daniel Esty, professor of law at Yale University, and Frank 
Biermann, of the Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research have proposed, advocated, and 
analyzed the creation and potential roles of an international organization dedicated solely to the 
environment.294  The proposed WEO would house environmental treaties, regulate infractions, 
290
 WTO Cancún 5th Ministerial Conference, Summary of September 13, 2003, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_13sept_e.htm, (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
291 See Summary of September 14, 2003, supra note 10.
292 Summary of September 12, 2003, supra note 289.
293 WTO Cancún 5th Ministerial Conference, Briefing Notes – Trade and the Environment, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/brief_e/brief14_e.htm#status, (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). 
294
 Steve Charnovitz, A World Environmental Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 326-27 (2002).
44
create policy, disseminate information, conduct research, and coordinate multilateral efforts to 
preserve the environment.295
Other scholars recommend that the WTO amend the GATT Article XX to allow 
Members to act in compliance with MEA trade measures.  George William Mugwanya proposes 
an addition to Article XX that would list unilateral measures restricting trade taken pursuant to 
MEAs as a viable exception to violations occurring under the GATT Article XI.296  Mugwanya 
recognizes that “MEAs and the GATT have equal status as treaties” and conflicts would 
therefore be subject to rules of the Vienna Convention in which the later signed treaty is 
supreme.297  This conflict could potentially cause the collapse of the GATT by subordinating it to 
any later signed treaty that contains contradicting trade measures.298
Kenneth F. McCallion and H. Rajan Sharma, of the law firm Goodkind, Labaton, Rudoff 
& Sucharow LLP in New York, propose the creation of an international environmental court.299
They cite the failure of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to address environmental issues 
and the non-binding dispute resolution systems currently in place in many MEAs as reasons to 
establish an international environmental court.300  McCallion and Sharma also specify the lack of 
standing for individuals, corporations, and NGOs in the ICJ as perpetuating acquiescence to 
environmental issues in the international forum.301
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The Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) recommend that the UN handle any WTO/ MEA 
related disputes.302  The rationale behind this position stems from the fact that the UN is 
competent in trade, the environment and sustainability.303  The FoEE contends that the “WTO is 
not an environmentally policy-making body” and fears “that negotiations under WTO auspices 
risk undermining the status of MEA’s.”304  FoEE calls for the immediate granting of observer 
status for all MEAs in all WTO bodies and the strengthening of compliance and dispute 
settlement mechanisms in MEAs to strike a better balance between the organizations.305   FoEE 
further demands that the MEAs be recognized as consistent with the WTO. 306
B.  Proposals from the Author
There are many proposed solutions by both environmentalists and those from the trade 
camp.  The proposals range from the creation of new intergovernmental organizations to an 
international court of environmental law.307  Moreover, others have considered amendments to 
GATT to create specific exceptions for multilateral environmental agreements, and still others 
have called for the expansion of the WTO or the UN to police the environment.308  These 
solutions should not be considered mutually exclusive.  They can be integrated to create an 
effective, fair and efficient system of environmental protection that will accommodate both 
environmentalists and trade purists.    
The integration of these proposals should first establish an organization, which could be 
formed under the UN, WTO, or independently, which would house the secretariats of the 
302 See After Doha and Johannesburg: Dispute over Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and Trade 
Rules: What Next?, Friends of the Earth Europe (Nov. 2002) 
http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/MEA_paper_Nov_2002.doc [hereinafter After Doha and Johannesburg].
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307 See discussion infra Part VI.5. 
308 See discussion infra Part VI.5.
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multilateral environmental agreements and coordinate their collective policymaking.309  Next, the 
legal structure of current MEAs must be assessed and reconciled with WTO through a series of 
compromises consisting of both WTO amendments to GATT and similarly structured 
amendments to provisions contained within MEAs.310  Third, the judiciary must possess 
jurisdiction over environmental matters, have the power to render binding decisions, and avail 
standing to states, NGOs, Corporations, and individuals.311  Improvements to the adjudication 
process would require modification of the ICJ, or the creation of a new judiciary composed of 
representation from the WTO, the UN and MEAs.312  Regardless of the legal structure, any new 
entity must work in close coordination with the UN, WTO and MEAs.  
Finally, the WTO must recognize the value that MEAs have to offer in the multilateral 
trading system.  It is necessary for the WTO to extend permanent observer status to MEAs in 
order to ensure adequate information exchange, the development of synergies, and the 
exploitation of the specialties that MEAs have to offer in the area of environmental law.313
Extending observer status to MEAs in the WTO will promote a more informed and educated 
decision making process by WTO Members with regard to the environmental consequences of 
their trade decisions.314
Preserving both the environment and the world’s natural resources is a task that everyone 
must undertake.  The environment is an increasingly important issue that must be addressed in 
this period of rapid economic growth and proportionally rapid increase in pollution, natural 
resource depletion, and environmental degradation.315  Environmental issues need to be dealt 
309 See generally Charnovitz, supra note 294.
310 See generally Mugwanya, supra note 221.
311 Id.
312 See generally McCallion & Sharma, supra note 299.
313
 See generally After Doha and Johannesburg, supra note 302.
314 Id.
315 See generally WTO Special Studies, supra note 88. 
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with on a global basis to avoid the promulgation of “race to the bottom” legislation, “competition 
in laxity” and “eco dumping.”316  After all every one has to share this planet, including current 
and further generations of both developed and developing nations.  Whether you support the 
Wold Trade Organization, a non-governmental organization, a multilateral environmental 
agreement, or even a corporation there is only one way to achieve harmony between trade and 
the environment.  We all must cooperate on a global level and comply with the principals of 
intergenerational equity in order to preserve the natural environment and all its resources for the 
future generations.317
316 See supra text accompanying note 90; see also WTO, Special Studies, supra note 88.
317 See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 66-77 (Richard 
A. Epstein et al. eds., 1998).  “Specifically, the principle of intergenerational equity requires conserving the diversity 
and the quality of biological resources, of renewable resources . . . as well as of our knowledge of natural and 
cultural systems.  The principal requires that we avoid actions with harmful and irreversible consequences for our 
natural and cultural heritage . . . without unduly shifting the costs to coming generations.” Id. at 76.
